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ABSTRACT: The number of labour market outsiders in Europe has dramatically increased, especially among 
the youth, potentially influencing social and political participation. Using logistic regressions and compara-
ble survey data – the British Household Panel (BHPS) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) – we 
connect insights drawn from Varieties of Capitalism and dualization literature with an investigation of indi-
vidual level outcomes in Britain and Germany. First, we disentangle the impact of skills on outsiderness 
among the overall population and the youth. Second, we analyse the influence of skills and outsiderness 
on people’s social and political participation. We suggest that skills matter in protecting individuals from 
labour market outsiderness, but they do so in different ways across liberal and coordinated market econ-
omies and age groups. While the possession of specific skills reduces the likelihood of being a labour mar-
ket outsider among young people, it has the opposite effect on political participation. In contrast, educa-
tion fosters participation but does not reduce the risk of becoming an outsider in the same age cohort. 
Moreover, although there is no difference between insiders and outsiders when it comes to political par-
ticipation, being an outsider may reduce social participation. Finally, young people are more likely to be 
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excluded from social and political participation in Britain than in Germany as a consequence of different 
welfare and socio-economic systems. 
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1. Introduction1 
 
The growth of youth unemployment, which reached new heights of 22.5% across the 
EU-27 in 2015 (Eurostat, 2015), as well as the precarisation of labour market conditions 
(Standing, 2011; Ferragina, 2014) reveals that the gap between labour market ‘outsid-
ers’ and ‘insiders’ is widening. One of the most dramatic possible consequences of this 
growing divergence could arguably be the disenfranchisement of labour market out-
siders, especially young people, from social and political participation. 
The aim of this paper is to bring new insights to this debate by linking traditional po-
litical economy macro-frameworks such as Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) and dualization 
literature with an investigation of individual-level outcomes in Britain and Germany. In 
this respect, we specifically test whether: (1) alternative skill sets influence the likeli-
hood of being a labour market outsider across different age groups; and (2) whether 
being a labour market outsider affects social and political participation. By selecting 
Britain and Germany, which are widely considered to be prototypical examples of two 
distinct socio-economic models, we underscore the broader significance of our study. 
Respectively, Britain and Germany constitute the prime European examples of liber-
al and coordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs), with very different welfare ar-
rangements (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Soskice, 1991; 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The 
British welfare state is considered minimalist in nature and characterised by means-
testing, while benefits in Germany are seen as more generous with an earnings-related 
dimension aimed at status maintenance (Esping-Andersen, 1990; 1999; Ferragina and 
Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; Ferragina et al. 2013a; 2015). Whereas workforce skills are rela-
tively interchangeable in Britain and portable between sectors of the economy, they 
are more specialised in Germany and specific to the operations of particular industries 
(Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Iversen, 2005).  
 
1 This work was supported by the John Fell Fund (for the project: ‘Social Inclusion and Participation in Rich 
Democracies: An Empirical Analysis through the Lens of Citizenship’) and by a public grant overseen by the 
French National Research Agency (ANR) as part of the “Investissements d’Avenir” program LIEPP (refer-
ence: ANR-11-LABX-0091, ANR-11-IDEX-0005-02). 
 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(3) 2016: 986-1014, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i3p986 
  
988 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we review the background 
literature to support the formulation of our research questions. Then, we illustrate the 
methodology used in the study and present our findings. Our conclusion discusses the 
wider implications of the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
Literature on dualization (for an overview see Emmenegger, et al., 2012) seeks to 
explain the increasing social divisions between labour market insiders and outsiders in 
rich OECD countries. It is important to note, however, that there is no consensus re-
garding the definition of labour market outsiderness within this debate. While there is 
agreement that the unemployed and individuals with temporary contracts – especially 
if their status is long-term – should be considered outsiders, a discussion has emerged 
regarding the status of part-time workers. Somewhat surprisingly, little attention has 
been paid to low-wage workers, who are often not included in the definition (see Häu-
sermann and Schwander, 2012). Since the 1990s, however, Germany has experienced a 
significant increase in low-wage work, creating a large cohort of ‘working poor’, while 
Britain has retained relatively high levels of in-work poverty (Brady, 2009). The working 
poor, similarly to those who are traditionally considered labour market outsiders in the 
literature, may also be largely excluded from economic and social life.  
Considering this long-standing debate and our aim to connect the macro- and micro-
levels of analysis, we define outsiders as people in precarious labour market positions 
(such as unemployment or temporary contracts) as well as those with incomes below 
the poverty line. In this definition, part-time doctors with high incomes are insiders, 
while workers with permanent contracts but low pay are outsiders.2 We argue that this 
analytical category of outsiderness is useful to investigate and compare countries with 
different structural characteristics such as Britain and Germany. In both countries, the 
words ‘Prekariat’ (Barbier 2005) and ‘Precariat’ (Standing, 2011) are far less common in 
the political and academic debate than in other European countries, despite the de-
regulation of the German labour market (with the consequent increase of non-
standard forms of employment such as ‘mini-jobs’) and the rising numbers of ‘working 
poor’ in Britain. We therefore use this analytical category to investigate whether cer-
tain working conditions and income levels might limit the ability of people to be full 
members of society. 
 
2 We thereby deviate from Rueda (2007) who includes part-time workers among outsiders. 
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In their analyses of the global shift of de-industrialization and the changing role of 
political actors, dualization scholars tend to rely on highly aggregated macro data, pay-
ing little attention to the potential role of skills and other micro-determinants (see 
Tomlinson and Walker, 2012) of outsiderness, or to the effect of labour market out-
siderness on social and political participation. 
First, at the theoretical level, the VoC literature (e.g. Estevez-Abe, et al., 2001; Hall 
and Soskice, 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Thelen, 2004; Iversen, 2005; Cusack et 
al., 2006; Iversen and Stephens, 2008) suggests that skills matter in determining the la-
bour market status of individuals. How then do skills affect the odds of being a labour 
market outsider? Furthermore, are there any contrasting patterns between Britain and 
Germany that relate to differences in these countries’ respective socio-economic struc-
tures?  
Historically, Britain can be understood as a prototypical LME, with a labour market 
predominantly relying on general skills. By contrast, Germany relies on a comparatively 
larger share of specific skills in the labour market, therefore representing a CME (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001). As general skills are more portable than specific ones, LMEs ‘re-
quire’ less generous welfare state arrangements for skill formation and skill retention 
(Hall, 2007). On the basis of a more specific definition of labour market outsiderness 
and relying on the insights of the VoC and dualization literatures at the individual level 
of analysis, we reason that employment in jobs requiring ‘specific’ skills or ‘high/low’ 
general skills (see Fleckenstein, et al., 2011) might have a different effect on the likeli-
hood of being a labour market outsider. Moreover, the impact of skills may prove to 
differ across age groups. 
Second, we suggest that labour market outsiderness and the possession of certain 
skills might also affect – in conjunction with other variables, i.e., education – social and 
political participation. Interest in politics constitutes the backbone of political participa-
tion, which is a clear manifestation of citizens' engagement in wider societal issues. 
Further, secondary groups are the foundation of social participation (involving mem-
bership in third sector organisations): they are ‘necessary (intermediate) bodies to 
graft atomistic individuals to the life of a nation’ (Durkheim, 1893). They lose this me-
diating function if large segments of the younger generation are excluded because they 
are labour market outsiders. In increasingly complex and modern societies, micro-
social communities such as the family are insufficient to give people a sense of inclu-
sion and participation. In order to feel a part of societal development, one needs to 
connect with others outside narrow informal networks through social and political par-
ticipation (Gorz 1992; Ferragina, 2010; 2012; 2013a). On this basis, we argue that inse-
cure and unstable employment may potentially threaten social and political participa-
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tion (Gorz, 1992:180; Ferragina, 2012) and that this risk might be greater in LMEs. 
Hence, we investigate how labour market outsiderness, in conjunction with employ-
ment in jobs requiring different skills, affects the social and political participation of 
British and German citizens.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
We operationalise our definition of outsiderness by including the following catego-
ries: unemployed people, workers with temporary or fixed-term contracts and those 
with net household incomes below 60 per cent of median income. We classify outsid-
ers nested in a family with an overall household income above the poverty line as in-
siders. 
The empirical models are based on logistic regressions as our dependent variables 
are binary. We are thereby predicting the logarithm for the odds of being an outsider 
from a clutch of predictors. We proceed in two steps: First, we explore how skills and 
age affect outsiderness. Second, we investigate how being an outsider, in conjunction 
with skills, influences social and political participation.  
The analysis is based on British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP) data (1995-2009), including around 14,000 and 20,000 indi-
viduals, respectively, for each wave. Our descriptive analysis uses the full length of the 
panel, while the regression models are limited to a single observation point (because 
data on social and political participation are included for the 2006 wave only). These 
two surveys are designed to enable subsequent comparative study (see McGinnity, 
2002; Scherer, 2001). 
 
3.1 Model A: The effect of skills and age on outsiderness  
We use the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88)3 to cate-
gorise different skill groups, which are captured using dummy variables for high gen-
eral, low general, and specific skills. Although the distinction between specific and gen-
eral skills captures key differences between British and German labour markets (as 
theorised by VoC scholars), the national composition of human capital has changed 
significantly as a result of deindustrialization. We therefore adopt Fleckenstein et al.’s 
 
3 We use the previous year’s ISCO-88 code for each respondent in the panel as unemployed people would 
otherwise be excluded from our sample. 
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(2011: 1626) methodology to differentiate between the three skill-sets above to ac-
count for the potential of skill polarization in post-industrial economies. 4  
Alongside skills, our predictors include socio-demographic variables such as gender, 
age, educational attainment, and household type.5 We do not control for income be-
cause it is used to define our dependent variable. The comparability of British and 
German systems of educational qualifications is ensured by using the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), with dummies for the comparative ISCED-
levels ranging from basic to higher education.6 We split respondents into five age 
groups to focus on the ‘young’, defined as those between 16 and 24 years of age (other 
age-groups are: 24-35; 36-50; 51-64), and cut all those aged above 65 or below 16 out 
of the sample, as well as respondents who do not report occupational codes (with the 
exception of unemployed people and workers with temporary contracts). For Germa-
ny, we use ‘marital status’ to determine the influence of family structure on the likeli-
hood of becoming an outsider. For Great Britain, we use the ‘household type’ (a varia-
ble not included in the GSOEP) instead, taking into account more detailed classifica-
tions such as single parenthood (Ferragina et al., 2013b). 
In addition, we control for the receipt of unemployment benefits in order to capture 
the structural differences between unemployment protection systems in both coun-
tries (German unemployment protection is more generous than its British counterpart; 
see Esping-Andersen, 1990). In Germany, transfers include two tiers of unemployment 
benefits (Arbeitslosengeld I/II) and in Britain they comprise the receipt of Income Sup-
port (IS) or the Jobseekers’ Allowance (JSA). Finally, in the case of Germany, we further 
 
4 We classify ‘legislators/senior officials/managers’ (Major Group 1), ‘professionals’ (Major Group 2) and 
‘technicians and associate professionals’ (Major Group 3) as groupings of occupations requiring high 
general skills, while ‘elementary occupations’ (Major Group 9), ‘service workers/shop and market sales 
workers (Major Group 5) and ‘clerks’ (Major Group 4) are identified as occupations requiring low general 
skills. Finally, ‘craft and related workers’ (Major Group 7) and ‘plant and machine operators and 
assemblers (Major Group 8) are grouped in the specific skill category. 
5 These predictors are commonly used to project labour market status, i.e. Alavinia and Burdorf (2008), as 
well as social and political participation, i.e., Van Oorschot and Arts (2005). 
6 Under ‘basic education’, we include the ISCED categories of 0 (‘in school’), 1 (‘inadequate’) and 2 
(‘general elementary’) in the GSOEP and 0 (‘not defined’), 1 (‘primary’) and 2 (‘low secondary’) in the 
BHPS. ‘Basic education’ captures respondents who have attained a Hauptschulabschluss in Germany or 
completed their GCSEs in the UK. The other categories, notably ‘secondary’, ‘secondary + vocational 
degree’ and ‘higher vocational’ are exactly the same in Germany and the UK, and use the ISCED 
classifications 3, 4, 5, respectively. Finally, in both countries we compress 6 (‘first degree’) and 7 (‘higher 
degree’) into the dummy ‘higher education’, because the category ‘higher degree’ has a very small sample 
size (less than 3% of the population sample in both countries) 
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control for East German residency. These independent variables are used to predict the 
odds of being a labour market outsider.7    
To sum up, we investigate how different skill-sets affect the odds of being a labour 
market outsider, whilst controlling for gender, educational attainment, age, marital 
status and/or household type, unemployment benefit receipt and region. In addition, 
we run regression models separately for different age groups (16-24, 25-35, 36-50, and 
51-64).  
  
3.2 Model B: The effect of outsiderness on social and political participation 
We investigate the effect of outsiderness on social and political participation by us-
ing the items ‘interest in politics’, ‘propensity to vote’, ‘membership in associations’ 
and ‘political party support8’ (Tables 4 and 5). We control for the same predictors as 
described above. Comparable variables for measuring ‘interest in politics’ are available 
in both countries. Both surveys ask respondents to rate their interest in politics.9 We 
also scrutinise a person’s ‘propensity to vote’. In the BHPS, political participation is 
measured using the responses to the question ‘Did you vote in the May 2005 UK gen-
eral election?’10 The GSOEP does not include information on whether a respondent 
voted in the last election. Instead, we use answers to the question ‘If the next election 
to the German “Bundestag” (the lower house of parliament) were next Sunday, would 
you vote?’. 11 Social participation is measured by capturing ‘membership’ in the follow-
ing associations: trade unions, environmental groups, professional organisations, and 
social groups/social clubs. The BHPS includes membership of a more detailed battery of 
organisations, but in order to achieve comparability, we rely on the sum of member-
ship in the associations enumerated above.12     
We therefore investigate how labour market outsiderness and skills affect the odds 
of being interested in politics, the likelihood of voting, and membership in secondary 
 
7 Insider=0/outsider=1. 
8 On the choice of these items, see literature review and Ferragina (2012). 
9 ‘Much’ or ‘Very much’=1; ‘Not much’ or ‘Not at all’=0.  
10 ‘Yes’=1/‘No’ or ‘Couldn’t vote’=0. 
11 ‘Definitely’ and ‘Probably’= 1; ‘maybe’, ‘Probably not’, ‘Definitely not’ and ‘Not eligible to vote’=0.  
12 We run an additional model in the UK including 14 different types of associations (these associations are 
those traditionally used to measure associational participation (Ferragina, 2012) and the results are 
similar. In addition, using the indicator membership in associations or participation in associations (also 
traditionally used in the social participation/social capital literature) does not make any significant 
difference in the magnitude and direction of the effect of outsiderness and skills on participation in 
secondary groups. 
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associations while controlling for the predictors outsiderness, gender, education, age, 
marital status and/or household type, unemployment benefit receipt and region.  
 
4. Results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Overview of Labour Market Outsiderness in the UK and Germany 
To shed light on the development of outsiderness in the UK and Germany over the 
past decades, we consider low income, unemployment and temporary work trends 
separately. Figure 1 depicts poverty rates after taxes and transfers in the United King-
dom and Germany since the mid-1970s (our definition coincides with the OECD defini-
tion), showing that poverty has steadily increased in Germany (to almost 15% of the 
population by the late 2000s). In the UK, poverty rates peaked in 1990, declining 
steadily thereafter but increasing slightly again towards the late 2000s. Overall, at 
18.4%, poverty rates are significantly higher in the United Kingdom than they are in 
Germany (14.8%). This difference is reflected in our sample, although overall poverty 
rates are lower (16% and 11% for the UK and Germany, respectively) due to our sample 
being restricted to members of the labour force13 rather than the population as a 
whole. Although the aggregate OECD data for poverty rates cannot be divided into age 
groups, our micro data shows that poverty is more severe among the young than the 
overall population.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 We cut our sample to include all respondents who report ISCO-88 occupational codes in the nine Major 
Groups, as well as unemployed people and temporary workers (regardless of whether they report an 
occupational code or not). We exclude those younger than 16 or older than 64, as well as respondents 
who fall into Major Groups 0 (Armed Forces) and 6 (Skilled agricultural and fishery workers). 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(3) 2016: 986-1014, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i3p986 
  
994 
 
Figure 1 - Poverty Rate After Taxes and Transfers, % of Total Population (Current OECD Definition).  
 
Source: OECD 
 
Unemployment rates between the UK and Germany largely diverge over the period 
analysed (Figure 2). Since the mid-2000s, German unemployment rates have fallen 
substantially while the economic crisis fuelled a sharp increase in the UK. This pattern 
is particularly striking among young people, with unemployment in the 16-24 age-
group surging from around 12% to over 21% in the UK during the 2000s, while the 
German rate has stabilised at 8% (after an increase from 5% during the crisis). 
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Figure 2 - Unemployment Rate in Germany and the UK.  
 
Source: Eurostat, LFS  
 
Similarly, the proportion of workers with fixed-term contracts has diverged between 
the two countries (Figure 3). While it has increased steadily in Germany since the mid-
1980s, reaching close to 15% of the total labour force in 2011, in the UK the trend has 
been less linear (increasing up until 1997, falling thereafter, and rising again during the 
crisis). With just 6% of British workers in temporary contracts in 2011, figures remain 
considerably lower than in Germany. This large difference is partly explained by the 
apprenticeship system in Germany, with up to a third of German youths (16-24) occu-
pying temporary contracts until the mid-1990s. Since then, the figure has jumped to 
over 50% in Germany while it has never reached more than 14% for the same age 
group in the UK. To avoid bias in the regression model, we exclude young people in ap-
prenticeships from our sample. 
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Figure 3 - Figure 3: Temporary Employees in Germany and the UK. As % of Total Number of Employees. 
 *West Germany until 1991 
 
Source: Eurostat, LFS  
 
Given increases in the numbers of working poor, unemployed people (especially in 
the UK) and workers with temporary contracts, outsiderness has been rising in both 
countries in recent decades. Dualization scholars (Emmenegger, et al., 2012) argue that 
the process of deindustrialization and labour market reforms are core drivers of this 
phenomenon. According to our sample, over 23% of the labour force can be consid-
ered ‘outsider’ in the UK compared to 21.6% in Germany. Levels of outsiderness among 
young people (16-24) are considerably higher than this, reaching 42.4% in the UK and 
56.1% in Germany. 14 These trends appear to indicate wide and growing disparities be-
tween generations. 
In the face of globalisation, deindustrialization, stagnant economic growth and struc-
tural readjustment of their economies, LMEs and CMEs appear to have developed dif-
ferent paths of labour market exclusion for young people. In the UK, the numbers of 
young unemployed people are increasing. In contrast, outsiderness among young peo-
ple in Germany is characterised by atypical employment. 
 
 
14 The higher figure in Germany is explained by the exclusion of apprentices, who represent over 50% of 
the age group and would largely be considered ‘insiders’. 
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4.2 The effect of skills on outsiderness  
 
4.2.1 Overall model 
In Germany, after controlling for the socio-economic predictors of our model, people 
occupying jobs requiring low general skills are more likely to be outsiders than those 
occupying positions requiring specific skills. Moreover, there is no difference between 
respondents with high general skills and specific skills. In contrast to Germany, individ-
uals occupying positions requiring high general skills are less likely to be outsiders in 
the UK (Table 1). Although occupations requiring specific skills appear to protect indi-
viduals from outsiderness compared to low general skilled jobs (as in Germany) the 
odds ratio is much smaller in the UK. 
 
Table 1 - Predicting Outsiderness in the UK and Germany, 2009 
        
 
    
 Variable Germany United Kingdom 
  
B Exp(B) M (SD) B Exp(B) M (SD) 
Skills 
       
 
Specific (ref.) 
  
0.190 
(0.392) 
  
0.161 
(0.368) 
 
High general 
0.029 
(0.091) 1.029 
0.502 
(0.500) 
-0.310*** 
(0.113) 0.734 
0.411 
(0.492) 
 
Low general 
0.323*** 
(0.089) 1.382 
0.308 
(0.462) 
0.232** 
(0.102) 1.262 
0.428 
(0.495) 
Unemployment Benefits 
      
 
Receiving unem-
ployment  
Benefits 
2.501*** 
(0.073) 
12.20
0 
0.142 
(0.349) 
2.849*** 
(0.160) 
17.27
7 
0.041 
(0.198) 
Region 
       
 
West Germany 
(ref.) 
  
0.754 
(0.431) 
   
 
East Germany 
0.141** 
(0.066) 1.152 
0.246 
(0.431) 
   Gender 
       
 
Female (ref.) 
  
0.494 
(0.500) 
  
0.500 
(0.500) 
 
Male 
-0.218*** 
(0.062) 0.805 
0.506 
(0.500) 
0.037 
(0.072) 1.037 
0.500 
(0.500) 
Age 
       
 
Young (16-24) 
(ref.) 
  
0.060 
(0.238) 
  
0.165 
(0.371) 
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25-35 
-1.024*** 
(0.110) 0.359 
0.195 
(0.396) 
-0.944*** 
(0.097) 0.389 
0.234 
(0.423) 
 
36-50 
-1.786*** 
(0.120) 0.168 
0.442 
(0.497) 
-1.199*** 
(0.092) 0.301 
0.383 
(0.486) 
 
51-64 
-1.793*** 
(0.135) 0.167 
0.303 
(0.460) 
-1.064*** 
(0.106) 0.345 
0.219 
(0.413) 
Education 
      
 
Basic (ref.) 
  
0.109 
(0.311) 
  
0.145 
(0.352) 
 
Secondary 
-0.044 
(0.093) 0.957 
0.482 
(0.500) 
-0.547*** 
(0.096) 0.579 
0.313 
(0.464) 
 
Secondary + voca-
tional degree 
-0.049 
(0.134) 0.953 
0.071 
(0.256) 
-0.447*** 
(0.109) 0.640 
0.171 
(0.376) 
 
Higher vocational 
-0.309** 
(0.146) 0.734 
0.081 
(0.273) 
-0.602*** 
(0.120) 0.547 
0.175 
(0.380) 
 
Higher education 
-0.052 
(0.113) 0.949 
0.258 
(0.438) 
-0.351*** 
(0.121) 0.704 
0.196 
(0.397) 
Marital Status 
      
 
Married (ref.) 
  
0.598 
(0.490) 
   
 
Single     
0.474*** 
(0.084) 1.606 
0.265 
(0.441) 
   
 
Widowed 
0.702*** 
(0.215) 2.018 
0.016 
(0.123) 
   
 
Divorced 
0.582*** 
(0.097) 1.789 
0.098 
(0.297) 
   
 
Separated 
1.056*** 
(0.162) 2.875 
0.024 
(0.152) 
   
 
Children 
0.281*** 
(0.069) 1.325 
0.362 
(0.481) 
   Household type 
      
 
Single (young) 
   
0.485*** 
(0.134) 1.624 
0.079 
(0.270) 
 
Single (old) 
   
-0.451 
(0.593) 0.637 
0.004 
(0.066) 
 
Couple (no chil-
dren) (ref.) 
     
0.237 
(0.425) 
 
Couple (depend-
ent children) 
   
0.382*** 
(0.091) 1.465 
0.385 
(0.487) 
 
Couple (non-
dependent chi) 
   
-0.050 
(0.110) 0.951 
0.164 
(0.370) 
 
Lone parent (de-
pendent chi) 
   
0.961*** 
(0.145) 2.614 
0.048 
(0.215) 
 
Lone parent (non- 
dependent chil-
   
0.185 
(0.157) 1.203 
0.048 
(0.214) 
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dren) 
 
Unrelated 
   
0.945*** 
(0.216) 2.574 
0.015 
(0.121) 
Constant 
-0.857*** 
(0.164) 
  
-0.713*** 
(0.157) 
  N  
 
11959 
  
8652 
  Notes: * p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; (standard error): Sources: GSOEP, BHPS 2009 
 
This finding is in line with the VoC literature. On the one hand, Germany is said to 
constitute a CME in which, historically, people with specific skills are well protected by 
the social security system and the training regime. On the other hand, the UK is a LME 
which relies on a social security system and a training regime that is not designed to 
protect specific skills as strongly as in Germany (see Estevez-Abe, et al., 2001; Wasmer, 
2002; Kitschelt, 2006; Emmenegger, 2009). The comparative lack of employment and 
unemployment protection in LMEs means that workers are discouraged from investing 
in specific skills, leading firms to adopt technologies heavily relying on transferable, 
general skills. The rising importance of general skills in LMEs has gone hand-in-hand 
with a rapidly growing service sector, which profits substantially from this labour sup-
ply (Hall and Soskice, 2001: 30). CMEs such as Germany, on the other hand, retain non-
market institutions that encourage workers, and thereby firms, to cultivate specific 
skills. However, the overall proportion of workers with specific skills has reduced de-
spite the increasing productivity of the German manufacturing sector, which has im-
proved relative to other countries (Carlin and Soskice, 2008).  
The importance of skills in Germany also manifests itself in the weak effect of educa-
tion on predicting outsiderness. Only workers with higher vocational degrees enjoy 
lower odds of outsiderness compared to employees with ‘basic’ education. At the same 
time, education plays a much larger role in the UK, as demonstrated by higher educa-
tional attainment being consistently associated with lower odds of outsiderness. Alt-
hough the effect of gender is not significant in the UK, male respondents face lower 
odds of becoming outsiders than women in Germany. This confirms several studies re-
porting an enlarged gender wage gap for low-skilled women at the bottom of wage dis-
tribution (Fitzenberger and Wunderlich, 2002; Arulampalam, et al., 2007). 
Both being single and having children in the household are associated with higher 
odds of outsiderness in both countries, and when these two factors are combined in 
single parenthood, the odds of outsiderness are considerably higher in the UK. Fur-
thermore, the receipt of unemployment benefits is associated with a higher likelihood 
of outsiderness – an expected result, given that unemployment is included in our defi-
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nition of outsiderness. This effect is stronger in the UK than it is in Germany, as previ-
ously hypothesised. It is also unsurprising that East Germans face higher odds of falling 
into outsiderness than West Germans. Age is associated with lower odds of outsider-
ness in both countries. However, these odds are greater in Germany than in the UK, 
predominantly due to the higher rates of atypical employment in Germany (Figure 3). 
 
4.2.2 Multi-sampling age groups 
For the overall sample, we identified that employment in jobs requiring specific or 
high general skills reduces the odds of falling into outsiderness compared to jobs re-
quiring low general skills in Germany. In an interesting contrast to the UK, the high 
general skill dummy is associated with higher odds of being an outsider compared to 
the specific skill dummy amongst the two youngest age groups in Germany (16-24 and 
25-35). This effect is reversed for the oldest age group (51-64), in which the high gen-
eral skill dummy carries much lower odds of being an outsider than the specific skill 
dummy (Tables 2 and 3). This finding may suggest that the persistent skill-gap and the 
demand for young and specialised workers improve the labour market chances of 
young people possessing specific skills (BMAS, 2011). 
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Table 2 - Predicting Outsiderness in Germany Between Age Groups, 2009 
 
Notes: * p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; (standard error). Source: GSOEP 2009     
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Table 3 - Predicting Outsiderness in the United Kingdom Between Age Groups, 2009 
 
Notes: * p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; (standard error). Source: BHPS 2009   
 
The role of educational attainment in predicting outsiderness also varies in signifi-
cance across age groups. In Germany, education remains largely insignificant, except 
for the 36-50 age group, where higher vocational and education degrees are associated 
with lower odds of outsiderness compared to basic education. This effectively wipes 
out the effect of skills in this age group. In the UK, education levels associated with vo-
cational degrees appear to strongly moderate the odds of being an outsider. Although 
secondary and higher education also contribute to reducing the probability of being an 
Ferragina, Feyertag, Seeleib-Kaiser , Outsiderness and participation 
 
1003 
 
outsider (in comparison to basic education), this effect seems significant only for the 
36-50 age group. 
Gender is only significant among Germans aged 36-50 years, while male respondents 
display lower odds of outsiderness than females. East Germans are only more likely to 
be outsiders than West Germans within older age groups (36-50 and 51-64), while this 
regional dummy is insignificant for younger cohorts. This may indicate that the gap be-
tween the two regions is progressively disappearing, although this can only be verified 
once younger cohorts enter their 30s. The receipt of unemployment benefits and hav-
ing children are associated with higher odds of outsiderness across all age groups. 
 
 
4.3 The effect of outsiderness on social and political participation 
 
Overall, in both countries, there is no significant difference between outsiders and 
insiders in predicting the odds of interest in politics or the likelihood to vote (Table 4). 
By contrast, outsiders are less likely to engage in social participation. These findings 
highlight the complex relationship between labour market outsiderness and participa-
tion. The increasing detachment from politics in the overall population (involving both 
insiders and outsiders) may be a reaction against isolated élites and the reduced sali-
ence of the right-left ideological cleavage. In addition, persistent differences in social 
participation between outsiders and insiders might be linked to the capacity of certain 
secondary groups (i.e., trade unions) to support specific segments of the ‘insider’ popu-
lation (i.e., people occupied in jobs requiring specific skills) (Ferragina 2013a; 2014). 
  
Table 4 - Predicting Political Participation in the UK and Germany, 2009 
            Variable Germany United Kingdom 
  
Interest in Politics 
Propensity to 
Vote M (SD) Interest in Politics Propensity to Vote M (SD) 
  
B 
Exp 
(B) B 
Exp
(B) 
 
B 
Exp
(B) B 
Exp
(B) 
 Outsider 
          
 
Outsider 
0.049 
(0.067) 1.050 
-0.065 
(0.085) 
0.9
37 
0.216 
(0.412) 
0.036 
(0.072) 
1.0
37 
-0.096 
(0.077) 
0.9
08 
0.234 
(0.423) 
Skills 
           
 
Specific 
(ref.) 
    
0.190 
(0.392) 
    
0.161 
(0.368) 
 
High gen-
eral 
0.733*** 
(0.066) 2.082 
0.784**
* (0.091) 
2.1
90 
0.502 
(0.500) 
0.637*** 
(0.081) 
1.8
90 
0.351*** 
(0.086) 
1.4
21 
0.411 
(0.492) 
 
Low gen-
eral 
0.349*** 
(0.070) 1.418 
0.335**
* (0.086) 
1.3
98 
0.308 
(0.462) 
0.287*** 
(0.080) 
1.3
32 
0.154* 
(0.084) 
1.1
66 
0.428 
(0.495) 
Unemployment Bene-
fits 
          
 
Receiving un-
empl. benefits 
-0.213** 
(0.083) 0.808 
-
0.621**
* (0.092) 
0.5
37 
0.142 
(0.349) 
-0.223 
(0.155) 
0.8
00 
-0.099 
(0.157) 
0.9
06 
0.041 
(0.198) 
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Region 
          
 
West Germany 
(ref.) 
    
0.754 
(0.431) 
     
 
East Germany 
-0.307*** 
(0.053) 0.736 
-
0.293**
* (0.069) 
0.7
46 
0.246 
(0.431) 
     Gender 
          
 
Female (ref.) 
    
0.494 
(0.500) 
    
0.500 
(0.500) 
 
Male 
1.083*** 
(0.047) 2.954 
0.165** 
(0.070) 
1.1
79 
0.506 
(0.500) 
0.982*** 
(0.055) 
2.6
70 
0.083 
(0.060) 
1.0
86 
0.500 
(0.500) 
Age 
           
 
Young (16-24) 
(ref.) 
    
0.060 
(0.238) 
    
0.165 
(0.371) 
 
25-35 
-0.062 
(0.123) 0.940 
0.213 
(0.131) 
1.2
37 
0.195 
(0.396) 
0.310*** 
(0.090) 
1.3
64 
0.805*** 
(0.100) 
2.2
37 
0.234 
(0.423) 
 
36-50 
0.392*** 
(0.125) 1.480 
0.332** 
(0.138) 
1.3
93 
0.442 
(0.497) 
0.499*** 
(0.086) 
1.6
47 
1.532*** 
(0.098) 
4.6
27 
0.383 
(0.486) 
 
51-64 
0.866*** 
(0.132) 2.377 
0.678**
* (0.153) 
1.9
69 
0.303 
(0.460) 
0.962*** 
(0.092) 
2.6
16 
2.232*** 
(0.110) 
9.3
14 
0.219 
(0.413) 
Education 
          
 
Basic (ref.) 
    
0.109 
(0.311) 
    
0.145 
(0.352) 
 
Secondary 
0.283*** 
(0.083) 1.327 
0.362**
* (0.362) 
1.4
36 
0.482 
(0.500) 
0.531*** 
(0.088) 
1.7
00 
0.334*** 
(0.083) 
1.3
97 
0.313 
(0.464) 
 
Secondary + 
vocational de-
gree 
0.567*** 
(0.111) 1.763 
1.144**
* (0.166) 
3.1
39 
0.071 
(0.256) 
0.926*** 
(0.098) 
2.5
24 
0.597*** 
(0.098) 
1.8
17 
0.171 
(0.376) 
 
Higher voca-
tional 
0.555*** 
(0.107) 1.742 
0.865**
* (0.150) 
2.3
74 
0.081 
(0.273) 
0.970*** 
(0.097) 
2.6
39 
0.742*** 
(0.097) 
2.1
00 
0.175 
(0.380) 
 
Higher educa-
tion 
1.240*** 
(0.092) 3.454 
1.303**
* (0.131) 
3.6
81 
0.258 
(0.438) 
1.522*** 
(0.101) 
4.5
83 
1.416*** 
(0.106) 
4.1
19 
0.196 
(0.397) 
Marital Status 
          
 
Married (ref.) 
    
0.598 
(0.490) 
     
 
Single     
0.032 
(0.067) 1.033 
0.031 
(0.094) 
1.0
32 
0.265 
(0.441) 
     
 
Widowed 
0.105 
(0.177) 1.110 
0.173 
(0.274) 
1.1
89 
0.016 
(0.123) 
     
 
Divorced 
-0.118 
(0.077) 0.889 
-
0.480**
* (0.097) 
0.6
19 
0.098 
(0.297) 
     
 
Separated 
-0.050 
(0.144) 0.951 
-0.286 
(0.190) 
0.7
52 
0.024 
(0.152) 
     
 
Children 
-0.026 
(0.053) 0.975 
0.097 
(0.073) 
1.1
02 
0.362 
(0.481) 
     Household type 
          
 
Single (young) 
     
-0.209** 
(0.102) 
0.8
12 
-0.171 
(0.109) 
0.8
43 
0.079 
(0.270) 
 
Single (old) 
     
-0.269 
(0.384) 
0.7
64 
0.103 
(0.436) 
1.1
08 
0.004 
(0.066) 
 
Couple (no-
children) (ref.) 
         
0.237 
(0.425) 
 
Couple (de-
pendent chil-
dren) 
     
-0.176*** 
(0.066) 
0.8
39 
-0.100 
(0.071) 
0.9
05 
0.385 
(0.487) 
 
Couple (non-
dependent chil-
dren) 
     
-0.032 
(0.079) 
0.9
68 
0.193** 
(0.089) 
1.2
13 
0.164 
(0.370) 
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Lone parent 
(dependent 
children) 
     
-0.334** 
(0.139) 
0.7
16 
-0.369*** 
(0.136) 
0.6
91 
0.048 
(0.215) 
 
Lone parent 
(non-dependent 
children) 
     
-0.118 
(0.128) 
0.8
89 
-0.214 
(0.136) 
0.8
07 
0.048 
(0.214) 
 
Unrelated 
     
0.540*** 
(0.202) 
1.7
16 
0.024 
(0.231) 
1.0
25 
0.015 
(0.121) 
Constant 
     
-2.562*** 
(0.141) 
 
-1.502*** 
(0.148) 
  N    11923  11299   8537  7280   
Notes: * p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; (standard error). Source: GSOEP, BHPS 2009 
 
Moving to the effect of skills, British and German workers in occupations requiring 
high and low general skills are more likely to be interested in politics and to vote in 
general elections than those employed in jobs requiring specific skills. Specialization in 
firm-based skills seems to reduce peoples’ interest in wider societal issues.  
This effect is further confirmed by two empirical findings: First, the odds are greater 
in Germany, where training for specific skills occurs at a much younger age and more 
profoundly shapes the lack of interest in the public sphere than it does in the UK (Table 
4). Second, formal education is more important in fostering political participation than 
the acquisition of vocational or firm-based specific skills (Table 4). Although general 
education appears to be less important for current generations than previous ones in 
reducing the risk of labour market outsiderness, it retains an important role in fostering 
social and political participation in both countries (cf. Hall, 1999 for the British case).   
In contrast to political participation, the effect of skills is reversed when it comes to 
predicting social participation. Here, workers in occupations requiring low general skills 
display lower odds of being members of organisations than employees in jobs requiring 
specific skills (Table 5). This finding is explained by the trade union membership com-
ponent of the overall membership variable, because workers in occupations requiring 
specific skills are more likely to be union members than employees in jobs requiring 
low general skills. If union membership is excluded from the social participation varia-
ble, the statistical significance disappears. The fact that people with specific skills tend 
to be more unionised than people with general skills does not come as a surprise. This 
could be due to the prevalence of industrial workers among those employed in jobs re-
quiring specific skills (see Ferragina 2014). 
 
Table 5 - Predicting Membership in Organisations in the UK and Germany, 2008/2007 
        Variable Germany United Kingdom 
  
B Exp(B) M (SD) B Exp(B) M (SD) 
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Outsider 
      
 
Outsider 
-0.365*** 
(0.062) 0.694 
0.206 
(0.405) 
-0.556*** 
(0.077) 0.573 
0.189 
(0.391) 
Skills 
       
 
Specific (ref.) 
  
0.202 
(0.401) 
  
0.165 
(0.372) 
 
High general 
0.234*** 
(0.060) 1.263 
0.492 
(0.500) 
0.134 
(0.082) 1.143 
0.401 
(0.490) 
 
Low general 
-0.105* 
(0.069) 0.900 
0.306 
(0.461) 
-0.160** 
(0.082) 0.852 
0.433 
(0.496) 
Unemployment Benefits 
      
 
Receiving unem-
ployment  
Benefits 
-0.491*** 
(0.069) 0.612 
0.159 
(0.366) 
-0.464** 
(0.211) 0.629 
0.033 
(0.178) 
Re-
gion 
       
 
West Germany 
(ref.) 
  
0.760 
(0.427) 
   
 
East Germany 
-0.469*** 
(0.048) 0.626 
0.240 
(0.427) 
   Gen-
der 
       
 
Female (ref.) 
  
0.485 
(0.500) 
  
0.501 
(0.500) 
 
Male 
0.488*** 
(0.043) 1.629 
0.515 
(0.500) 
0.099* 
(0.055) 1.104 
0.499 
(0.500) 
Age 
       
 
Young (16-24) 
(ref.) 
  
0.061 
(0.240) 
  
0.168 
(0.374) 
 
25-35 
-0.191* 
(0.101) 0.826 
0.198 
(0.399) 
0.661*** 
(0.100) 1.937 
0.238 
(0.426) 
 
36-50 
0.176* 
(0.104) 1.192 
0.460 
(0.498) 
1.192*** 
(0.095) 3.294 
0.379 
(0.485) 
 
51-64 
0.413*** 
(0.113) 1.511 
0.281 
(0.449) 
1.264*** 
(0.101) 3.538 
0.215 
(0.411) 
Education 
      
 
Basic (ref.) 
  
0.108 
(0.311) 
  
0.145 
(0.352) 
 
Secondary 
0.240*** 
(0.069) 1.271 
0.483 
(0.500) 
0.134 
(0.085) 1.143 
0.321 
(0.467) 
 
Secondary + voca-
tional degree 
0.332*** 
(0.097) 1.394 
0.070 
(0.256) 
0.158 
(0.994) 1.171 
0.165 
(0.371) 
 
Higher vocational 
0.498*** 
(0.094) 1.645 
0.084 
(0.277) 
0.719*** 
(0.092) 2.052 
0.179 
(0.383) 
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Higher education 
0.653*** 
(0.080) 1.922 
0.255 
(0.436) 
1.310*** 
(0.098) 3.705 
0.191 
(0.393) 
Marital Status 
      
 
Married (ref.) 
  
0.614 
(0.487) 
   
 
Single     0.058 (0.062) 1.060 
0.255 
(0.436) 
   
 
Widowed -0.066 (0.172) 0.936 
0.014 
(0.119) 
   
 
Divorced 
-0.201*** 
(0.071) 0.818 
0.094 
(0.291) 
   
 
Separated 0.077 (0.132) 1.080 
0.024 
(0.152) 
   
 
Children 
0.091* 
(0.048) 1.095 
0.381 
(0.486) 
   Household type 
      
 
Single (young) 
   
-0.110 
(0.100) 0.896 
0.079 
(0.270) 
 
Single (old) 
   
-0.432 
(0.358) 0.649 
0.005 
(0.067) 
 
Couple (no chil-
dren) (ref.) 
     
0.246 
(0.431) 
 
Couple (depend-
ent children chi) 
   
-0.244*** 
(0.065) 0.784 
0.380 
(0.485) 
 
Couple (non-
dependent chil-
dren) 
   
-0.133* 
(0.080) 0.875 
0.159 
(0.365) 
 
Lone parent (de-
pendent children) 
   
-0.051 
(0.131) 0.951 
0.049 
(0.216) 
 
Lone parent (non-
dependent chil-
dren) 
   
-0.021 
(0.130) 0.980 
0.047 
(0.211) 
 
Unrelated 
   
-0.034 
(0.216) 0.966 
0.015 
(0.122) 
Constant 
-0.606*** 
(0.132) 
  
-1.918*** 
(0.141) 
  N    12015     8468     
Notes: * p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01; (standard error). Source: GSOEP 2007, BHPS 2008 
 
Male respondents in both countries enjoy better odds of political and social partici-
pation than females. The only exception is found in the model that predicts the pro-
pensity to vote in the UK, in which gender is insignificant. Looking at marital status 
Partecipazione e conflitto, 9(3) 2016: 986-1014, DOI: 10.1285/i20356609v9i3p986 
  
1008 
 
and/or household type, divorced people in Germany and lone parents in the UK display 
lower odds of political and social participation.  
Finally, the most striking difference between the UK and Germany is linked to the 
age category. Although age is associated with greater odds of social and political partic-
ipation, the odds ratios are considerably larger in the UK than they are in Germany. For 
example, while individuals in the 51-64 age group are twice as likely to vote in Germa-
ny than youths aged between 16 and 24, British 51-64 year olds are over nine times 
likelier to vote than their younger counterparts (Table 4). 
 Looking at these results, young people in the UK seem much more excluded from 
social and political participation than their German counterparts. This finding may be 
explained by two factors: First, there is a greater share of unemployed people among 
the British youth outsiders. As argued by Ferragina et al. (2013b), people in atypical 
employment are more likely to participate in associative life than unemployed people. 
This may be because they spend time in the workplace, regardless of whether it is pre-
carious employment. This time provides a greater scope for ‘socialization’ and en-
gagement in associational life than being unemployed and remaining at home. Second, 
the institutional settings of LMEs might deepen the negative impact of labour market 
outsiderness on the political and social exclusion of young people because of incom-
plete social protection, an effect that does not appear in the overall population. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
The number of outsiders, especially among young people, is increasing in both the 
UK and Germany because of deindustrialization and concomitant labour market re-
forms (Eichhorst and Marx 2012; Emmenegger et al. 2012). This increase predates the 
recent and on-going economic crisis, perhaps signaling a more profound shift in con-
temporary labour markets (as shown in Figures 1-3). Despite this similar trend, the na-
ture of outsiderness and its effect on social and political participation varies between 
the two countries, a fact that may be associated with differences in political economy 
and social security models. Increases in youth outsiderness appear to reflect growing 
unemployment in the UK, compared to growing poverty and forms of atypical em-
ployment in Germany.  
By investigating how socio-demographic factors, in particular age and skills, influ-
ence outsiderness, and how skills and outsiderness affect social and political participa-
tion, we have garnered four insights: First, skills seem to matter in explaining labour 
market outsiderness. This is especially true for Germany, where, in agreement with the 
literature, our models show that specific skills protect workers from outsiderness com-
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pared to low general skills. Specific skills are acquired through the apprenticeship sys-
tem in Germany, which provides young people with an attachment to the labour mar-
ket. Skills play a less significant role in the UK, a LME, than they do in Germany. In the 
UK, specific skills do not offer the same protection from outsiderness compared to high 
general skills. Instead, higher levels of educational attainment partially replace skills in 
offering protection against outsiderness. This is confirmed by the higher returns on ed-
ucation measured in the UK compared to Germany (Corak, 2006). In contrast to the 
general model, the analysis of individual age groups in the UK shows that not even 
higher education helps young people reduce their chances of falling into outsiderness. 
Second, skills seem to have a different effect across age groups. Among young peo-
ple in Germany, workers occupying jobs requiring specific skills face a lower likelihood 
of becoming outsiders than people in positions requiring high general skills. The ad-
vantages of high general skills only appear to manifest themselves for those in the 51-
64 age bracket. Despite having to rely on a low level of remuneration, young people 
are aware that the successful completion of an apprenticeship significantly increases 
their chances in the labour market. Furthermore, wage inequality has historically been 
lower in Germany than in the UK, signaling to young people that they might be able to 
achieve middle class status without graduating from university (D’Addio, 2007).  
Third, although there is no significant difference between insiders and outsiders 
when it comes to predicting political participation, being an outsider seems to reduce 
the odds of social participation in both countries. Further, in contrast to the positive 
impact in mitigating the likelihood of being a labour market outsider, employment in a 
job requiring specific skills seems to put a brake on political participation compared to 
employment that requires low general skills. 
 In contrast to skills, we observe that higher educational attainment directly increas-
es social and political participation, especially in the UK. Among younger generations, 
education has completely lost its ability to reduce the risk of labour market outsider-
ness. That said, it retains an important role in fostering social and political participa-
tion. On a broader level, this finding suggests the existence of a potential trade-off for 
policy makers in an age of austerity. They face the prospect of investing in specific skill 
formation or general education, especially in Germany where specific skills play a much 
larger role in reducing outsiderness.  
Fourth, the difference in the levels of social and political participation between age 
groups is much larger in the United Kingdom than it is in Germany. Even when control-
ling for socio-demographic factors as well as outsiderness, people below the age of 24 
remain significantly more excluded in the UK than they do in Germany.  
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The enormous discrepancy between the odds of a young and an old person engaging 
socially and politically reflects the depth of youth outsiderness in Britain, where the 
proportion of young outsiders that are unemployed is much larger than among German 
youth, who instead tend to be in temporary contracts. Moreover, the lack of social pro-
tection within the welfare system seems to negatively affect young people more when 
compared to the United Kingdom’s wider population. This in turn signals an important 
problem for the United Kingdom. If the market does not provide consistent job oppor-
tunities (as it has in previous decades), the shortcomings of a liberal welfare state sys-
tem may depress social and political participation. 
Before concluding, we would like to highlight that our contribution by no means ex-
hausts the important debate on the relationship between outsiderness, its determi-
nants and participation. Micro-data helps individuate some important trends, but does 
not allow us to fully disentangle the mechanisms that connect these variables. A more 
in-depth analysis of the effects of different degrees of outsiderness on social and politi-
cal participation might help to complete the picture we present here.  
For instance, in-depth interviews and/or experiments could be undertaken among 
young outsiders in the UK and Germany to analyse forms of political and social partici-
pation that are not captured by standardised household surveys. If the objective of pol-
icymakers is to revive social and political participation (see Ferragina and Arrigoni, 
Forthcoming) in a period of great disenchantment and declining legitimacy for our de-
mocracies, there is definitely scope for further enquiry into the effects of youth out-
siderness on social and political participation in years to come. 
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